Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5088378 | Journal of Banking & Finance | 2015 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
Using unique data on trading commission payments to mutual fund rating companies (MFRCs) by mutual funds in China, this paper investigates whether the conflicts of interest arising from trading commission payments bias MFRCs' mutual fund star ratings and hence affect their informativeness. We find the rating of a mutual fund is more optimistic when the MFRC either (i) receives trading commission fees from the mutual fund or (ii) can potentially receive fees in the future. The paper further shows that the usefulness of ratings in terms of predicting a fund's future performance is negatively impacted by conflicts of interest. There is also evidence that investors can see through the problem, responding less enthusiastically (in terms of fund flows) to the ratings of conflicted MFRCs. We further find that the introduction of a rating qualification system that aims to improve mutual fund rating quality exacerbates the rating bias.
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Yamin Zeng, Qingbo Yuan, Junsheng Zhang,