Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5089014 | Journal of Banking & Finance | 2014 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on firm cash holdings and the value of cash. We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. This positive effect is magnified by firm leverage and mitigated by the presence of financial constraints. We further find that the marginal value of cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. Our evidence supports the view that inside debt tilts managerial incentives toward bondholders and helps balance the competing interests of stockholders and bondholders. The evidence also suggests, however, that inside debt can harm shareholder value by encouraging excess cash holdings.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Yixin Liu, David C. Mauer, Yilei Zhang,