Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5090416 | Journal of Banking & Finance | 2009 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
This study examines the relevance of bank board structure on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (1534 observations), this study finds that strong bank boards (boards reflecting more of bank shareholders interest) particularly small and less restrictive boards positively affect bank risk-taking. In contrast, CEO power (CEO's ability to control board decision) negatively affects bank risk-taking. These results are consistent with the bank contracting environment and robust to several proxies for bank risk-takings and different estimation techniques.
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Shams Pathan,