Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5091069 Journal of Banking & Finance 2010 12 Pages PDF
Abstract

The empirical literature suggests that the limit order book contains information that might be used by the specialist to his own advantage. I develop a model where there is a strategic specialist who competes against a limit order book and has information about supply. The presence of a strategic specialist in an imperfectly competitive limit order book market induces non-monotonicity of market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Moreover, the existence of private information about supply significantly affects market performance as it induces, among other effects, lower market liquidity. Finally, this model suggests another link between Kyle's (1985, 1989) [Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315-1336, Kyle, A., 1989. Informed speculators with imperfect competition. Review of Economic Studies 56, 317-356] and Glosten and Milgrom's (1985) [Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed markets. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71-100] models by allowing for strategic behaviour of the specialist.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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