Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5092082 | Journal of Comparative Economics | 2013 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the historical process of legal central- ization and increased religious toleration by the state. We develop a model based on the mathematics of mixture distributions which delineates the conditions under which legal centralization raises the costs faced by states of setting a narrow standard of orthodox belief. We compare the results of the model with historical evidence drawn from two important cases in which religious diversity and state centralization collided in France: the Albigensian crusades of the thirteenth century and the rise of Protestant belief in the sixteenth century.
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Authors
Noel D. Johnson, Mark Koyama,