Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5092493 | Journal of Comparative Economics | 2011 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
⺠The diversified structure of emerging economy business groups facilitates expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling insiders through tunneling. ⺠We provide evidence of this using firm level panel data from India. ⺠Firms with ownership-control wedge lower, ownership opacity higher, than a group's core are likelier in activities unrelated to the core. ⺠Our findings are strengthened by evidence of tunneling in the same direction. ⺠Taken together this suggests an expropriation motive for diversification.
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Authors
Raja Kali, Jayati Sarkar,