Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5097676 The Journal of Economic Asymmetries 2016 16 Pages PDF
Abstract
We analyze the benefits and costs of a non-euro country opting-in to the banking union. The decision to opt-in depends on the comparison between the assessment of the banking union attractiveness and the robustness of a national safety net. The benefits of opting-in are for now only potential and uncertain, while costs are more tangible. Due to treaty constraints, non-euro countries participating in the banking union will not be on equal footing with euro area members. Analysis points out that reducing the weaknesses of the banking union and thus providing incentives for opting-in is not probable in the short term, mainly due to political constraints. Until a fully-fledged banking union with well-capitalized backstops is established it may be optimal for a non-euro country to join the banking union upon the euro adoption. Assessing first experiences with the functioning of the banking union and opt-in countries will be crucial for non-euro countries when deciding whether to opt-in.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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