Real options and contingent convertibles with regime switching

We consider a firm with no assets in place but an option to invest in a project. The investment is irreversible but delayable in a regime-switching economy. The firm issues equity, straight bonds (SBs) and contingent convertibles (CoCos). We provide the closed-form prices for the firm׳s securities and the pricing and timing of the option. Our numerical analyses discover that issuing CoCos instead of SBs induces much less agency cost of debt. The agency cost is higher in a boom economy than in recession but the difference is small. There is a unique CoCos׳ conversion ratio such that the agency cost arrives at the minimum value zero. The inefficiencies arising from asset substitution and debt overhang are much more significant in recession than in boom. Only if the conversion ratio is not too small, the two inefficiencies disappear during boom periods. While the effects of the conversion rate on optimal capital structure and firm value and those of supervision and jump intensity on optimal CoCos׳ coupon are ambiguous and weak, the stricter the supervision or the longer the economy remains in recession, the less the option value and the optimal SBs׳ coupon.