Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5098817 | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | 2013 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
This paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of patent-race winners and the ensuing effect on aggregate R&D effort. We propose a quality-ladder model where leaders strategically acquire a technology advantage and are able to innovate. In this context, product-market regulation, by affecting this strategic behaviour, may have either a positive or negative effect on aggregate R&D intensity. The negative effect is likely to pertain in liberal markets, whereas the positive influence arises in more regulated environments, and can be stronger for larger jumps in innovation. These steady-state equilibrium outcomes are consistent with the puzzling patterns in data from manufacturing industries in 14 OECD countries over the 1987-2003 period.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Control and Optimization
Authors
Ivan Ledezma,