Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099501 | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | 2011 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Control and Optimization
Authors
Pascaux Smala Fanokoa, Issam Telahigue, Georges Zaccour,