Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099768 | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | 2010 | 8 Pages |
Abstract
The paper studies a differential game of waste management (disposal). Each of three neighbouring regions is endowed with a stock of waste, but no additional waste is generated in any region and waste does not decay from natural reasons. A region's stock of waste can be reduced only by dumping on its neighbours. The model features two externalities: a strategic externality caused by the fact that the payoff of a coalition depends on the actions of players outside the coalition, and a stock externality caused by the fixed overall amount of waste. The game has a finite time horizon and it is shown that intertemporal core-theoretic cooperation can be sustained under intuitive conditions.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Control and Optimization
Authors
Steffen Jørgensen,