Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100078 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2017 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative; and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum - including the Condorcet winner alternative - there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implements the Condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature.
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Authors
MatÃas Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris,