Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100860 | Journal of International Economics | 2017 | 50 Pages |
Abstract
Under external reference pricing (ERP) the price that a government permits a firm to charge in its market depends upon the firm's prices in other countries. In a two-country (home and foreign) model where demand is asymmetric across countries, we show that home's unilaterally optimal ERP policy permits the home firm to engage in a threshold level of international price discrimination above which it is (just) willing to export. If the firm faces a price control abroad or bargains over price with the foreign government, an ERP policy can even yield higher home welfare than a direct price control.
Related Topics
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Authors
Difei Geng, Kamal Saggi,