Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5101827 | Journal of Public Economics | 2017 | 12 Pages |
â¢Examines the impact of substitution from competition in charitable givingâ¢Shows that matches increase giving to a particular charityâ¢Finds that more current competitors with or without matches does not reduce givingâ¢Also finds that more matched competitors over previous periods does not reduce giving
Despite an extensive literature on the impacts of a variety of charitable fundraising techniques, little is known about whether these activities increase overall giving or merely cause donors to substitute away from other causes. Using detailed data from Donorschoose.org, an online platform linking teachers with prospective donors, I examine the extent to which matching grants for donations to certain requests affect giving to others. Eligibility for matches is determined in entirely by observable attributes of the request, providing an exogenous source of variation in incentives to donate between charities. I find that, while matches increase giving to eligible requests, they do not appear to crowd out giving to similar ones, either contemporaneously or over time.