Best response game of traffic on road network of non-signalized intersections

This paper studies the traffic flow in a grid road network with non-signalized intersections. The nature of the drivers in the network is simulated such that they play an iterative snowdrift game with other drivers. A cellular automata model is applied to study the characteristics of the traffic flow and the evolution of the behaviour of the drivers during the game. The drivers use best-response as their strategy to update rules. Three major findings are revealed. First, the cooperation rate in simulation experiences staircase-shaped drop as cost to benefit ratio r increases, and cooperation rate can be derived analytically as a function of cost to benefit ratio r. Second, we find that higher cooperation rate corresponds to higher average speed, lower density and higher flow. This reveals that defectors deteriorate the efficiency of traffic on non-signalized intersections. Third, the system experiences more randomness when the density is low because the drivers will not have much opportunity to update strategy when the density is low. These findings help to show how the strategy of drivers in a traffic network evolves and how their interactions influence the overall performance of the traffic system.