Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5103770 | Research in Economics | 2017 | 42 Pages |
Abstract
We study the evolution of compliance and regulation of a renewable common pool resource, a fishery in particular, with appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with harvesting quotas is the result of imitation described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with a proportional fine and an endogenized probability of audit. The outcome of regulation is characterized in terms of monomorphic and polymorphic steady states with respect to compliance. Using numerical simulations stability properties are examined, and sensitivity analysis explores the effect of various parameters on polymorphic steady-state outcomes.
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Authors
Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos, Anastasios Xepapadeas,