Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5111668 | Journal of Operations Management | 2016 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
China provides a vast and prominent manufacturing base, so curtailing its local supplier opportunism represents a primary concern for local and foreign buyers. Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines how regulatory uncertainty and relationship structure moderate the role of contracts and trust in restricting local supplier opportunism in China. An analysis of 293 buyer-supplier dyads in China reveals that contracts are more effective in deterring supplier opportunism when regulatory uncertainty is high. In addition, contracts help curtail opportunism more in domestic, compared with international, buyer-supplier relationships, whereas trust is more effective in restricting supplier opportunism in international relationships than in domestic ones.
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
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Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Authors
Mengyang Wang, Qiyuan Zhang, Yonggui Wang, Shibin Sheng,