An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon strategies based on the government-enterprise game in the complex network context

Low-carbon development patterns have gradually attracted more attention because of strong shocks to society and the economy from environmental problems. Developing a low-carbon economy is essential for every country to improve sustainable economic development, and doing so is at the forefront of low-carbon research. Policy and government intervention play a key role in the development of a low-carbon economy. Using game-based learning theory for reference, this paper builds an evolutionary model of low-carbon strategies based on the game between the government and enterprises in the context of a complex network. It then studies the effects of government incentives on enterprises regarding the diffusion of low-carbon policies and how enterprises compete and transform in the Newman-Watts small-world network. We introduce government policy encouragement as a factor in the decision-making process of companies' adoption of a low-carbon strategy, thus enriching the literature on the diffusion of low-carbon strategies. The model proposed in this paper can be used as a tool to evaluate the diffusion and application of low-carbon strategies among companies. The findings suggest that enterprises' expectation of government incentives including subsidy and regulation determines whether low-carbon strategies can be diffused, and the diffusion speed. The more quick enterprises adjust their expectations in the government-enterprise game, the more enterprises will learn and follow to adopt effective low-carbon strategy. When enterprises attach great importance to the expected earnings from government incentives, the less effective low-carbon strategy adopted initially can be replaced by another more effective one.