Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
7242092 Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2015 10 Pages PDF
Abstract
We study multilevel interactions using experimental methods. Does the efficiency of a production team suffer from the freeriding behavior of some team members at the firm level? Can we identify behavioral spillovers affecting teams? We isolate common tasks that teams must complete - coordination and cooperation - and model each of them using a simple experimental game that is designed to avoid identification problems. By observing a team's efficiency before and after the firm-level event, we identify the behavioral spillovers of freeriding to team-level cooperation and coordination. We demonstrate that team composition with respect to freeriding behavior of individual members during the firm-level conflict conditions behavioral spillovers. In particular, the efficiency of heterogeneous teams decreases after a firm-level conflict, whereas homogeneous teams can improve their performance.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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