Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243221 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2015 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. Victory thus ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing the victor's rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns create two motives for conflict. When only the outcome is informative, the less feared party may attack to show that they are tougher than expected. If the fact that conflict occurred at all also conveys information, the more feared party may attack. If they do not, the population view peace as a sign of weakness and switch loyalties anyway. In this case, conflict arises to save face.
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Authors
Iain W. Long,