| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7243814 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2013 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent can undertake influence activities. ⺠Influence activities allow the agent to distort the supervision signal collected by the principal. ⺠Influence activities entailing private costs to the agent lead to low powered incentives. ⺠When influence activities entail costs for the organization high powered incentives can be optimal. ⺠The principal may decide not to supervise the agent even if it is costless to do so.
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Authors
Brice Corgnet, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara,