Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243826 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2013 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
We demonstrate that receiver credulity can be understood through a false consensus effect: the likelihood with which individuals believe messages about the behavior of others can be explained by their own behavioral tendencies in a comparable situation. In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual contributions is obscured. Instead, subjects communicate what they have contributed through a post hoc announcement mechanism. Using subjects' social value orientation as a proxy for their contribution tendency, we show that those high on the measure have inflated beliefs about the contribution of others. This, in turn, impacts their contribution and punishment decisions.
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Authors
Bernd Irlenbusch, Janna Ter Meer,