Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243831 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2013 | 17 Pages |
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of supervision and incentives on subjects' performance and cheating behavior in a real effort task. With a sample of 540 participants in three different experiments, we investigated the interaction between motivation and monetary and social rewards, with and without supervision. Our results suggest: (1) lack of supervision promotes cheating, though workers tend to cheat moderately; (2) both economic and social incentives increase motivation but only when workers like their jobs; (3) workers do not increase their band of acceptable dishonest behavior for possible economic rewards, but they do increase dishonest behavior for possible social rewards, like prestige.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
David Pascual-Ezama, Drazen Prelec, Derek Dunfield,