Orígenes y evolución de la política fiscal militar postkeynesiana en Estados Unidos

After the Second World War, during the so-called “Golden Age” the U.S. economy, until late 1971, demonstrated new capacities in terms of macroeconomic stability: recessions were brief and shallow while growth was strong, generating shared returns for the working class, a burgeoning middle class and for capital-owners. Neither then or since, up to the moment, has there been sufficient recognition of the key role played by military expenditures in this dynamic process accounting for at times -including induced multiplier effects- as much as twenty-five percent of the GDP. In this article we examine the origins of what has been termed “Military Keynesianism” during the Golden age, emphasizing the little-known leading role played by Leon Keyserling, who exercised behind-the-scenes power in order to convert Keynesian theory into a macroeconomic policy consistent with the U.S. institutional context that would be sufficiently large to promote long-term conditions of full employment. With a degree of audacity, at an historically opportune moment given the socioeconomic resonance of the foundational document known as “NSC-68” promulgated by the “State within the State” -the National Security State- Keyserling successfully challenged the fallacious neoclassical “law” of guns or butter.