Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7348658 | Economics Letters | 2018 | 5 Pages |
Abstract
This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.
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Authors
Kenju Kamei,