Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7348769 | Economics Letters | 2018 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
Suppose that every player in an extensive-form game incorporates perfection in conducting forward induction reasoning. To capture this idea, we propose the notion of “perfect extensive-form rationalizability” (PEFR). In every simultaneous move game, PEFR coincides with Brandenburger's (1992) permissibility, which can be obtained by Dekel and Fudenberg's (1990) procedure. Although PEFR is closely relate to iterated admissibility and other cautious reasoning processes, we show that there is no relationship in general.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Chih-Chun Yang,