Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7349500 | Economics Letters | 2018 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
In the investment game by Berg et al. (1995), we extend the trustee's action space by the opportunity to take money from the trustor, in addition to the amount received. Experimental findings indicate that this significantly reduces the trustors' investment. While the trustees' average payback relative to the amount received remains unaffected, we observe an important decrease in the relative frequency of zero returns. Furthermore, we do not observe a single incidence of money being taken from the trustor. We explain this result by intention-based social preferences.
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Claudia Keser, Asri Ãzgümüs,