Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7352718 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2018 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
A natural way to relate the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and Simon and Zame (1990) would be to show the following: Each game with an endogenous sharing rule satisfying the assumptions of Simon and Zame (1990) is such that the payoff correspondence has a measurable selection inducing a normal-form game whose mixed extension satisfies the assumptions in Reny (1999). We present a result showing that this is not so in general, even when the assumptions in Reny (1999) are weakened to those in Barelli and Meneghel (2013).
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck,