Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
7352883 Games and Economic Behavior 2018 23 Pages PDF
Abstract
We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has finite recall, is stationary, and all forecasts lie on a finite grid. To construct the procedure, we deal also with the related setups of online linear regression and weak calibration. Finally, we show that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games-“smooth calibrated learning”-in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time averages of play are approximate correlated equilibria).
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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