Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7352906 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2018 | 27 Pages |
Abstract
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of 'undominated merge-externalities'. Similar to the well-known 'balanced contributions' characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to 'threat points' present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy 'balanced merge-externalities'. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.
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Authors
Ben McQuillin, Robert Sugden,