Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7353081 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2018 | 17 Pages |
Abstract
Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain “facilities.” All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a “trimness” condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games with structured utilities, all facilities are trim. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Keywords
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Nikolai S. Kukushkin,