Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7353094 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2018 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
Ternary voting games (TVGs) model situations where a voter has three options, which can be thought of as yes, no, and abstention. This paper presents ÏË, an extension of the Shapley-Shubik power measure to ternary voting games. ÏË measures a voter's power as the probability that the voter will be pivotal given that they do not abstain. This contrasts with other extensions of the Shapley-Shubik measure to TVGs, which measure power as the probability that a player's vote is pivotal no matter what that vote is. Desirable properties of power measures in SVGs are extended to TVGs and ÏË is shown to satisfy these properties.
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Authors
Jane Friedman, Cameron Parker,