Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7358025 | Journal of Econometrics | 2018 | 43 Pages |
Abstract
In games, the multiplicity of equilibria poses a challenge for identification and estimation. The existing literature typically abstracts from this multiplicity by assuming that the data are generated from a single equilibrium. Instead of imposing such restrictions, this paper provides sufficient conditions to non-parametrically identify payoff primitives in finite action games with incomplete information, while allowing for multiple equilibria. I then propose a two-step estimator and illustrate its finite-sample performances via Monte Carlo simulations. Furthermore, I study the strategic interaction among radio stations when choosing different time slots to air commercials. I indeed find evidence to support the existence of multiple equilibria.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Statistics and Probability
Authors
Ruli Xiao,