Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359179 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2018 | 23 Pages |
Abstract
We introduce and analyze an efficiency criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This efficiency criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide conditions under which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.
Related Topics
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Authors
Battal DoÄan, Serhat DoÄan, Kemal Yıldız,