Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359194 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2018 | 41 Pages |
Abstract
This paper studies the population dynamics of cultural traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission with a perfectly-forward looking cultural leader. We show that there exists a threshold size in terms of population above which the cultural leader becomes active. We also show that a policy affecting some key parameters (such as the cost of providing the religious good) has a different impact in the short run and in the long run due to over-reactions or under-reactions of the different cultural groups. Finally, we study the cultural competition between two forward-looking cultural leaders with opposite objectives. We show that the steady-state cultural equilibrium depends on the time preference structure of the two leaders.
Keywords
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Authors
Thierry Verdier, Yves Zenou,