Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359477 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2016 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter κ. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator dynamics of the coupled model. We confirm the existence of a bifurcation in the dynamics of the system and identify three regions for equilibrium selection, one of which does not appear in common one- and two-population models. We also design a continuous-time experiment, exploring the dynamics and the equilibrium selection. The data largely confirm the theory.
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Authors
Volker Benndorf, Ismael MartÃnez-MartÃnez, Hans-Theo Normann,