Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359669 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2015 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common prior, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism.
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Authors
Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó,