Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7364131 | Journal of International Economics | 2016 | 31 Pages |
Abstract
This paper examines the incentives of national regulators to coordinate capital adequacy requirements in the presence of systemic risk in global financial markets. In a two-country model, correlated asset fire sales by banks generate systemic risk across national financial markets. Absent coordination, national regulators choose inefficiently low levels of macro-prudential regulation. Thus, symmetric countries always benefit from relinquishing their authority to a central regulator that establishes uniform regulations across countries. I also consider the separate case of asymmetric countries: while there is a limit to coordination when countries are sufficiently asymmetric in a single dimension, existence of asymmetries in multiple dimensions might actually relax this limit or even eliminate it.
Related Topics
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Authors
Gazi Ishak Kara,