| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7365068 | Journal of International Money and Finance | 2018 | 69 Pages |
Abstract
Theory and previous empirical studies suggest that CEO risk preferences affect hedging. We challenge this idea in a 5-year time series setting by using inside debt (i.e., CEO pension and deferred compensation) and the CEO Vega and CEO Delta, as proxies of CEO risk preferences, and document that neither risk-averse (i.e., debt like compensation) nor risk-seeking (i.e., convex compensation) inducing CEO compensation packages influence corporate hedging. Moreover, we find CEOs who have more previous work experience and high job tenure to be positively related to hedging.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
John A. Doukas, Sonik Mandal,