Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7369965 | Journal of Public Economics | 2015 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
Regulations to curb tax avoidance and evasion through charitable foundations have been in place since the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Newly-compiled longitudinal data makes it possible to estimate the effects of these regulations by comparing affected and unaffected foundations before and after the reform. Donations and entry dropped precipitously. Proxy variables suggest significant deterrence of abuses, but half of the decline in donations can be explained by the increased cost of running a foundation. The results highlight the potential for large reductions in the benefits of regulation when the cost of compliance affects externality-producing actions such as charitable giving.
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Authors
Benjamin M. Marx,