Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7372859 | Mathematical Social Sciences | 2018 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
In a voting situation where there are two alternatives, simple majority rule outputs the alternative with the most votes or outputs a tie if both alternatives receive the same number of votes. For any nonnegative integer k, the difference of votes rule Mk outputs the alternative that beats the competing alternative by more than k votes. If the two alternatives are not necessarily treated equally, then we get the class of Mk,l rules where the integers k and l are the thresholds for when one alternative beats the other. Llamazares (2006) characterized the class of Mk rules with the conditions of anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, weak Pareto and cancellation. We extend Llamazares' Theorem by proving that the Mk,l rules are the only voting rules satisfying anonymity, monotonicity, and cancellation. In addition, we describe the class of voting rules that satisfy only monotonicity and cancellation.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Authors
Sarah Schulz King, Robert C. Powers,