Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7380856 | Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications | 2014 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
It is well-known that individual diversity is a typical feature within the collective population. To model this kind of characteristics, we propose an evolutionary model of public goods game with two types of players (named as A and B), where players are located on the sites of a square lattice satisfying the periodic boundary conditions. The evolution of the strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy adoption from a randomly selected neighbor with a probability, which not only depends on the payoff difference between players, but also on the type of the neighbor. For B-type agents, we pose a pre-factor (0
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Mathematical Physics
Authors
Cheng-jie Zhu, Shi-wen Sun, Li Wang, Shuai Ding, Juan Wang, Cheng-yi Xia,