Interpretación conforme, clave para la legitimidad democrática en el control constitucional normativo

This research is about the tension between democracy and constitutionalism, which derives from judicial review of legislative (or popularly created) laws, i.e. from normative constitutional control of acts. The counter-majoritarian difficulty or dilemma lies on the principle that legitimacy of the State and that of authority in general, resides on the respect of the majority's will. I propose refute that difficulty or dilemma, through what I call “non objection triad”, which implies that constitutional judges begin the review assuming the constitutionality of legislative law under review (presumption of constitutionality), so they can only declare its unconstitutionality if it contradicts Constitution clearly and unquestionably (deference to legislator), and if one cannot interpret the law under scrutiny in a way it does not contradicts Constitution (consistent interpretation). This last duty is not only about law and constitutional technique, but, and above all, a consequence of respecting majority's will.