Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7551572 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A | 2018 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
One might have thought that if something has two or more distinct realizations, then that thing is multiply realized. Nevertheless, some philosophers have claimed that two or more distinct realizations do not amount to multiple realization, unless those distinct realizations amount to multiple “ways” of realizing the thing. Corey Maley, Gualtiero Piccinini, Thomas Polger, and Lawrence Shapiro are among these philosophers. Unfortunately, they do not explain why multiple realization requires multiple “ways” of realizing. More significantly, their efforts to articulate multiple “ways” of realizing turn out to be problematic.
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Arts and Humanities
History
Authors
Kenneth Aizawa,