Nash equilibrium strategies of generating companies (Gencos) in the simultaneous operation of active and reactive power market, with considering voltage stability margin

As Gencos are responsible for providing active and reactive power generation, they should devise good bidding strategies for energy and reactive power market. The paper describes a method for analyzing the competition among transmission-constrained Gencos with incomplete information. The proposed methodology employs the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) for modeling a Genco’s bidding strategy in energy market and uses Expected Payment Function (EPF) to construct a bidding framework in the reactive power market. The problem of finding the optimum strategy of Gencos is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem, where the upper sub-problem represents individual Genco’s payoff and the lower sub-problem solves the ISO’s market clearing problem. The ISO’s market clearing model is modified with applying generator Active Participation Factors to improve the voltage stability margin. The IEEE 39 bus test system is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.

► We model the behavior of Gencos in the active and reactive power markets. ► Genco’s strategy is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem. ► The ISO’s market clearing model is modified with applying generator APFs. ► Good forecast of Genco’s information will increase the accuracy of proposed method. ► Obtained profit of Gencos depend on their bidding strategy.