Corporate social responsibility as an entrenchment strategy, with a focus on the implications of family ownership

Taking as its basis the classical agency conflict between owners and managers, this article investigates issues of managerial discretion, entrenchment and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in family firms. Using an international sample, its purpose is to examine the promotion of CSR as a strategic shield against the costs of managerial discretion and to determine whether this use of CSR is moderated by family ownership. The results obtained support the argument that CSR may provide managers who manipulate earnings, as a discretionary practice, with the opportunity to entrench themselves. This would be an outcome of the decrease in activism and surveillance by stakeholders whose social and environmental demands are satisfied by the exercise of CSR. Thus, by satisfying stakeholders' demands, managers can use a socially responsible strategy as a mechanism for self-defence. Moreover, our results show that CSR is moderated by the ownership structure of family firms. Family owners serve as active monitors of managers, thus alleviating the classical agency problem and decreasing both the risks associated with managerial discretion and the use of CSR as entrenchment.