Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
8101544 | Journal of Cleaner Production | 2016 | 28 Pages |
Abstract
Governments' energy-saving emission reduction policies and consumers' low-carbon preference have important implications for an enterprise's production operations. In this paper, we consider a low-carbon supply chain channel with one manufacturer and one retailer and show how to optimize the low-carbon supply chain management decision and improve the supply chain performance through contract design. This paper analyzes how the co-op advertising contract and the co-op advertising & emission reduction cost sharing contracts impact the low-carbon supply chain's optimal decision and coordination. We also explore how the optimal decision and coordination change when a retailer has fairness concerns. We have several findings. First, regardless of whether or not the retailer has fairness concerns, a co-op advertising contract cannot achieve channel coordination, but can enhance channel effectiveness; Second, when the retailer does not have fairness concerns, the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts can achieve channel coordination and achieve win-win situation under certain conditions; Third, the retailer's fairness concerns can change the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts' coordination in some cases. Our study contributes to the theoretical basis for the design of low-carbon supply chain cooperation contracts, especially in cases where the retailer has fairness concerns.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Energy
Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
Authors
Yanju Zhou, Maojing Bao, Xiaohong Chen, Xuanhua Xu,