Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
8253844 | Chaos, Solitons & Fractals | 2018 | 5 Pages |
Abstract
Human beings have a natural tendency to feel jealous of those who have more than themselves. A previous report found that harmful behavior stemming from jealousy can actually encourage cooperation. The present study considers the efficiency of jealousy-motivated sanctions and the appropriate balance of sanctions and enforcement costs to best encourage cooperation. Through a series of numerical simulations of a spatial prisoner's dilemma game, we find that in the case of a lattice population structure, stronger sanctions and higher sanction efficiency ultimately result in more robust cooperation. In contrast, in the case of a scale-free population structure, higher sanction costs cause the cooperation level to rise.
Keywords
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
Physics and Astronomy
Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
Authors
Ryo Matsuzawa, Jun Tanimoto,