Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
841853 | Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods & Applications | 2010 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
This paper studies the stability of weakly Pareto–Nash and Pareto–Nash equilibrium for multiobjective generalized games with the payoff perturbed. Using a simple characterization of the weakly Pareto–Nash solution, we obtain a generic continuous result concerning weakly Pareto–Nash solution mapping. Examples are given to show that Pareto–Nash equilibrium mapping is neither upper semicontinuous nor lower semicontinuous. Through seeking the sub-mapping, we prove that most multiobjective generalized games have at least one essential Pareto–Nash solution.
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Authors
Q.Q. Song, L.S. Wang,