| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 883466 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2015 | 8 Pages |
•We compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games (games involving other-regarding preferences and games that are strategically challenging).•Students are more likely to behave as selfish and rational agents than non-students across the board.•The differences are most pronounced in games involving other-regarding preferences and are less pronounced in games that are cognitively more demanding.
This study exploits the opening of the experimental lab in Oxford to compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games, some of which involve other-regarding preferences (Trust Game, Dictator Game, and Public Goods Game) and others which have game forms that are strategically challenging (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction). We find that students are more likely to behave as selfish and rational agents than non-students. Our findings suggest that students are different than non-students with respect to their social preferences and their ability to reason strategically. Experiments using students are likely to overestimate the extent of selfish and rational behavior in the general population.
